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Abstract: This paper discusses a puzzling tension in attributions of moral responsibility in 
cases of resultant moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for 
unlucky outcomes, but less-than fully-responsible for unlucky outcomes brought about 
differently than intended. This tension cannot be easily discharged or explained, but it 
does shed light on a famous puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty 
Traveler. 
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 There is a tension in our moral thinking about the relationship between causation 
and moral responsibility. On the one hand, people are responsible only for what is in their 
control. On the other hand, people are responsible only for what they actually cause. But 
what people actually cause is, in many ways, not entirely in their control. In a famous 
pair of cases, two drunk drivers each head home from the bar. One drunk driver makes 
her way home safely, while the other drunk driver strikes and kills a pedestrian. 
Intuitively, the lucky agent is not responsible for a death and the unlucky agent is 
responsible for a death. Given that both agents have the same intentions and perform the 
same actions, what makes the moral difference is the unlucky occurrence of a bad 
outcome in one case but not in the other. Such resultant moral luck, or luck involving 
how things turn out, is thought to challenge the idea that agents can be held responsible 
only for what is in their control. In cases of resultant moral luck, what is out of an agent’s 
control is whether or not an outcome occurs. 
 But whether the outcome occurs is not the only thing that can be out of an agent’s 
control. Consider a case of deviant causation, roughly, a causal situation in which a 
particular planned outcome is brought about in an unplanned manner. Suppose that 
Assassin shoots at Victim, intending to kill him, but the shot misses. However, the shot 
startles a sleeping cassowary who then angrily mauls Victim to death. What is out of 
causal control of the assassin is not just whether the unlucky event occurs, but the process 
by which the unlucky event is brought about. If Assassin had not shot, Victim would not 
have died. Nevertheless, the prevailing intuition is that Assassin is not morally culpable 
for Victim’s death, given that it happened in such a strange way. The unlucky agent is 
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responsible in the case of the drunk driver, but the assassin is not responsible in the case 
of the angry cassowary. 
 This contrast between intuitions is an instance of a puzzling tension in our 
treatment of cases of moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for 
unlucky outcomes, but only partly morally responsible for unlucky outcomes in which 
the causal process occurs differently than they intended. The tension represents a deeper 
inconsistency in our thinking about the relationship between causation and resultant luck 
more generally:1 luck seems to minimize responsibility in some cases, but not in others.  
 That tension is the focus of this paper. Here is the plan. In section 1, I lay out the 
problem in detail, giving several more cases of the phenomenon. I discuss the apparent 
tension between intuitions about resultant moral luck and intuitions about deviant 
causation. I examine the prospects for explaining away the tension, and also the 
possibility of a uniform approach to cases of resultant moral luck. In Section 2, I show 
how this tension sheds light on the difficulty of solving another well-known puzzle about 
causation and moral responsibility, that of the Thirsty Traveler.  
 In what follows, I will make a few assumptions for the sake of argument. First, I 
will assume that there is such a thing as moral luck-- that is, that luck can make a 
difference to an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome. Though this is a 
controversial matter, I will assume, for example, that the drunk driver who kills a 
pedestrian is more morally responsible than the drunk driver who does not, even if they 
are both blameworthy for poor intentions and bad actions.2 Second, I will assume that 
consequences stemming from actual causation play some role in moral responsibility for 
outcomes, even if that role turns out to be small. This means that moral responsibility is 
more than a matter of assessing a person's character or intentions at the time of a 
particular outcome, though those are also relevant. A person must, in some sense, be 
causally connected to an outcome in order to be held responsible for it.3 Third, while I 
hope to stay as neutral as possible on what moral responsibility consists in, in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See also Sartorio (2012), who discusses multiple sources of resultant moral luck. Sartorio does not, 
however, argue for a tension between them. 
2	  Here I disagree with moral internalists such as Khoury (2018), who argue that what matters for moral 
assessment is a person’s inner states. 
3	  I will also assume that omissions can be causes, and thus agents can be causally connected to outcomes by 
way of omissions. 
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discussion I will assume that it amounts to blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.   
 
1. Moral Luck 
 Distinguish between three elements of a causal structure: (i) whether the effect 
occurs, (ii) the causal process by which the outcome is brought about, and (iii) the 
manner in which the effect occurs.4 Whether the effect occurs is a matter of the effect’s 
happening or not happening—for example, the occurrence of a pedestrian’s death versus 
its non-occurrence. The causal process by which the outcome is brought about involves 
what, exactly, constitutes the causal process which leads to the outcome’s occurrence—
for example, a bullet causing Victim’s death versus an angry cassowary. The manner in 
which the effect occurs concerns the particular way in which the relevant outcome 
happens—for example, death by bullet-related versus cassowary-related injuries.5 
 Much attention has been paid to cases in which luck makes a difference to 
whether the effect occurs. But that is only one piece of the puzzle. Each element of the 
causal structure that is out of the agent’s control is subject to luck. In Angry Cassowary, 
among the things that are out of control of the assassin is the second part of the causal 
structure, or the particular means by which the outcome is brought about. Call this sort of 
situation causal process luck.  
 Causal process luck is an additional kind of resultant moral luck at work in cases 
of deviant causation. It is additional because it occurs on top of traditional resultant luck 
involving the outcome: in our cases of deviant causation, it is very unlucky that the 
outcome occurs despite its circuitous causal route. The prevailing intuition in cases of 
deviant causation is that the initiating agent is not morally responsible for the outcome, 
even if she is morally responsible for some lesser act such as the attempt to bring about 
the outcome. To help warm up to this idea, consider a few more cases:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This is slightly different than Sartorio’s taxonomy of resultant luck, which she characterizes thus: “First, 
agents may not fully control whether certain outcomes occur. Second, in cases where those outcomes do in 
fact occur, agents may still not fully control whether their behavior results in those outcomes. And, finally, 
in cases where their behavior does in fact result in those outcomes, agents may still not fully control the 
way in which they do.” (2012, p.  85) 
5	  There is another kind of causation-related resultant moral luck, proportionality luck, that I do not discuss 
here. Proportionality luck involves circumstances out of an agent’s control either increasing or decreasing 
an agent’s proportion of moral responsibility for an outcome. See my (2017) for an extended discussion of 
proportionality luck. 
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Careless Driver.  Galen plots to murder Gillian with poison. As he is driving to buy the 
materials for the poison, he fails to see a pedestrian in the pedestrian walkway, and 
strikes and kills the pedestrian. Upon rushing out of the car, he realizes the pedestrian 
was Gillian. 
 
Angry Friend. Joey plans to murder Jake by poisoning his drink. While preparing the 
poison, Joey is so nervous that he breaks the bottle of poison. Very shortly thereafter, 
Jake slips on a bit of glass from the broken poison bottle, and dies from the fall. 
 
In each of these cases, an agent initiates a causal process to bring about an intended 
outcome, but the intended outcome is brought about by means so different than those 
planned by the agent that the agent is not responsible for the occurrence of the outcome. 
The deviance of the causal process from the agent's original intention reduces moral 
responsibility, and in some cases, legal responsibility for the outcome.6 Luck enters the 
picture because something out of the agent's control-- the particular nature of the causal 
process—downgrades culpability for the intended outcome to culpability for a mere 
attempt.  
 One might initially be skeptical that initiators of deviant causal chains should 
count as causes of the relevant outcomes. But note that there is counterfactual 
dependence between the outcome and the initiator of a deviant causal chain. In the case 
of the angry cassowary, the victim would not have been mauled to death had the assassin 
not shot. In Angry Friend, Jake would not have died had Joey not prepared the poison. 
Given the existence of counterfactual dependence, even if transitivity failed generally, 
this is arguably not a case where transitivity fails. So appealing to the failure of 
transitivity is not a good idea, at least in this case (if not more generally). Moreover, there 
are no promising routes to denying the efficacy of deviant causes. The prospects for a 
principled distinction between deviant and non-deviant causation are bleak.  
 More generally, it is plausible that agents who initiate deviant causal chains feel 
something like agent regret. According to Williams (1993), agent regret is a type of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See my "Deviant Causation and the Law" (MS) for an extended discussion of the role of deviant causation 
in legal responsibility. 
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regret felt by an agent who is causally but not morally responsible for an outcome. 
Williams’ paradigmatic case of agent regret involves a truck driver who accidentally hits 
a child who darts out in front of his vehicle. It is reasonable in this case for the truck 
driver to feel regret over what he has done even though he is not at fault. Similarly, a 
non-mal-intentioned initiator of a deviant causal chain might regret what has occurred 
despite not being morally responsible for the outcome. Initiators of deviant causal chains 
are to be considered causes.  
 Return to the cases with which we began, which I shall call Drunk Driver and 
Angry Cassowary. As I suggested at the outset, the intuition that luck makes a moral 
difference is not stable across all cases of resultant luck. Though Drunk Driver involves 
luck in whether the outcome occurs and Angry Cassowary involves luck in how the 
outcome is brought about, typically, the agent is seen to be fully responsible in the former 
case but not in the latter case. Similarly with Careless Driver and Angry Friend: because 
the causal processes go awry, the agents are not fully responsible, despite the occurrences 
of the intended outcomes. The deviance of the causal process seems to supersede more 
typical considerations about luck and responsibility—namely, that a person is still fully 
morally responsible for an outcome impacted by luck. 
 Call this phenomenon TENSION. Specifically, there is a tension between a 
commitment to moral responsibility of the agent in the drunk driver case but not in the 
case of the angry cassowary. Why? Because in both cases, an agent initiates a causal 
chain leading to a particular outcome. In both cases, it is bad luck that the outcome 
occurs. But only in one case, Angry Cassowary, does an element that is out of control of 
the agent-- the nature of the causal process-- reduce moral responsibility for the outcome. 
For some reason, whether the outcome occurs seems to matter less than whether the 
causal process leading up to the outcome matches the agent's intentions. 
 TENSION is puzzling because it reflects the unevenness with which luck impacts 
moral responsibility. In traditional cases of resultant luck, an agent is fully morally 
responsible for an outcome even if it owes to circumstances beyond her control. That the 
outcome is out of her control does not lessen moral responsibility. But when the causal 
process runs out of control, it reduces moral responsibility for an outcome, even if the 
intended outcome occurs. 
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 This tension raises a few challenges. One challenge is to explain why the 
inconsistency exists: why hold people fully responsible in one sort of case, but not 
another? From whence does the moral exception arise? Another challenge is to try to 
resolve or eliminate the tension: is it possible to systematize the treatment of resultant 
moral luck? I turn now to these topics. 
 A natural first inclination is to explain away the tension by appealing to 
something special about the causal process which amplifies its effect on moral 
responsibility. The rough idea is that there is particular moral significance attached to the 
fit between an agent's intentions for a causal process, and the way that process actually 
occurs. If the causal process deviates significantly from the agent’s intentions for it, then 
it makes sense to decrease the agent’s moral responsibility for the outcome. This idea 
comports with an epistemic requirement on moral responsibility, similar to the 
foreseeability requirement on legal responsibility. If an agent can't foresee the bizarre 
causal process leading to the outcome, then she isn't responsible for it, or is at least less 
responsible for it. 
 But this strategy proves difficult to defend. First, the outcome in each of these 
cases is foreseeable, and the agents' intentions line up with the relevant outcomes. Each 
agent intends to cause a victim's death. Shooting at someone, for example, brings with it 
a foreseeable risk that the person will die as a result of the shot. If the outcome is 
foreseeable and the agent acts in order to bring about the outcome, why impose the 
epistemic constraint on the causal process leading to the outcome? 
 Second, drawing a principled distinction between deviant and non-deviant causal 
processes is extremely difficult. Exactly how deviant must the causal process be in order 
for the agent to be less responsible for the outcome? Almost no one imagines an intended 
causal process in perfect, exhausting detail. There are mildly deviant causal processes 
that nonetheless do not minimize moral responsibility, as in the following case: 
 
Ricochet. Jayantha shoots at Jordan, intending to kill him. The bullet ricochets off of a 
nearby rock and kills Jordan. 
 
Here, the causal process does not occur in the way that Jayantha intends. Nonetheless, the 
	   7	  
natural intuition is that Jayantha is still morally responsible for Jordan's death, since the 
causal process is not so different than the one that Jayantha intended. Deviance in the 
causal process isn’t an automatic defeater for moral responsibility; it minimizes 
responsibility only in some cases. Locating the source of the moral exception in the 
nature of the causal process is an unpromising avenue for explaining away the tension.   
 Rather than locate the moral exception in the deviance of causal processes, it 
might be tempting to hold that there is something about the occurrence of the intended 
outcome that renders it immune to responsibility-decreasing factors. The general idea is 
that when an outcome occurs in the way planned by the agent, the agent is responsible for 
it. But when it does not occur in the way planned, the agent is not responsible for it. In 
Angry Cassowary, for example, the victim's death occurs via a cassowary-mauling rather 
than the intended gunshot. The assassin is less culpable for this unplanned mode of death. 
This thought makes a fair bit of theoretical and practical sense: we hold people 
responsible for outcomes when the intended outcomes occur as a result of their actions, 
but not when those outcomes don't occur.  
 But there are several wrinkles. First wrinkle: in cases of deviant causation, the 
intended outcome does occur. Sometimes the outcome even occurs via the intended 
mode. For example: 
 
Lazy Assassin. Becky is dispatched to kill Victim. Becky shoots at Victim, but misses. 
The shot wakes up Bill, who was independently dispatched by a different assassination 
agency. Bill shoots Victim and kills him. (Bill would not have shot had Becky not 
awakened him.) Had Becky not shot, Victim would not have died. 
 
In this example, Victim dies in the way that Becky intends, via gunshot. It is the causal 
process that occurs differently than she intends, not necessarily the outcome.7  
 Second wrinkle: whether the particular planned outcome occurs is also subject to 
luck, based on the modal fragility of the outcome. According to Lewis, we should call an 
event modally fragile "if, or to the extent that, it could not have occurred at a different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Note that this lesson can be generalized to other cases as well. Though many of the examples in this paper 
have outcomes that occur differently than intended, it is easy enough to cook up cases in which the 
intended sort of outcome occurs. 
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time, or in a different manner. A fragile event has a rich essence; it has stringent 
conditions of occurrence." (1986: p. 196) It is conceptually and metaphysically unclear 
how modally fragile outcomes are in these cases. But if the planned outcome occurs in a 
significantly different way than that planned by the agent, it might count as a different 
outcome entirely. Recall Careless Driver, in which Galen brings about Gillian’s death by 
hitting her in a pedestrian path on the way to buying the poison. Here, the location, time, 
and manner of death are very different than what Galen had planned—so different that 
Galen is not to be held morally responsible for intentionally killing Gillian (even though 
he might be held responsible for some other, lesser transgression involving vehicular 
negligence). But it is a matter of luck that the intended outcome occurred so differently 
than what he planned that it counts as a distinct outcome.  
 The susceptibility of modally fragile outcomes to luck is particularly problematic 
because there is thought to be a causal asymmetry between hasteners and delayers.8 A 
hastener brings about a particular outcome sooner than it would have been brought about 
otherwise; a delayer puts off an outcome to a later time than it would have otherwise 
occurred. Typically, hasteners are taken to be causes whereas delayers are not.9 For 
instance: 
 
Anti-venom. Drake is bitten by a scorpion and taken to a hospital to receive anti-venom. 
Five hours after receiving the infusion, Drake dies from a reaction to the anti-venom. If 
he had not died from the anti-venom, he would have died from the scorpion bite a few 
hours later. 
 
Here, the infusion of anti-venom hastens Drake’s death. Intuitively, the infusion causes 
Drake’s death, even though all it did, in some sense, is speed up something that was 
already going to occur. In contrast, delayers are generally not taken to cause their 
outcomes. For example: 
 
Slow anti-venom. Drake is bitten by a scorpion and taken to a hospital to receive  anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See Lewis (1986) and P. Mackie (1992) for the canonical discussions. 
9	  Though for an argument that hasteners and delayers are causally symmetric, see Touborg (2018). 
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venom. The anti-venom slows the progression of the scorpion venom. Drake dies twelve 
hours later than he would have without the anti-venom. 
 
Intuitively, the anti-venom does not cause Drake's death; it merely delays something that 
was going to happen in any case. It is merely lucky that the administration of the anti-
venom caused Drake to die later rather than sooner. 
 Many deviant causes hasten or delay their outcomes. If the outcomes are fragile, 
whether a particular outcome occurs is subject to luck with respect to when, where, and 
how it happens. Change the nature of the outcome, and one might change the identity of 
the outcome entirely. Modal fragility undermines the attempt to explain away TENSION 
by appealing to the occurrence of the outcome as the most significant feature of moral 
assessment, because whether a particular modally fragile outcome occurs is also a matter 
out of an agent’s control. I tentatively conclude that attempts to explain away TENSION 
are unpromising.  
 But an even larger challenge lies in trying to resolve TENSION, i.e., 
systematically treat all cases of resultant moral luck. I won’t hazard such a solution here, 
but I will make a few pessimistic remarks about the prospects. I begin by noting that a 
systematizing moral treatment of resultant luck would require treating all cases 
coherently. For example, if agents are fully morally responsible in cases involving 
resultant moral luck, then they are responsible in all such cases, not just some of them. 
Or, if the involvement of resultant luck lessens moral responsibility, then it should do so 
in all such cases. But such a systematic treatment would be too revisionary to be 
palatable. One would not want to hold that the drunk driver who kills a pedestrian is less 
responsible for the outcome because she is unlucky. Retaining a commitment to reduced 
moral responsibility in cases of deviant causation requires such a view. Alternatively, one 
might hold that agents who initiate deviant causal chains are fully responsible for the 
outcomes in those cases, just as the drunk driver who kills the pedestrian is fully 
responsible. Some might find this solution tempting-- especially those antecedently 
drawn to full responsibility of agents in cases of deviant causation. But such a 
commitment would include the unpalatable result that agents be morally responsible for 
outcomes resulting from extremely deviant causal chains. For example: 
	   10	  
Asbestos. Assassin aims to kill victim by poisoning her. Assassin prepares a canteen full 
of poison, but the poison turns out to be inert. However, unbeknownst to assassin, the 
canteen is lined with asbestos. Victim drinks from the canteen for several years, 
eventually dying of an asbestos-related condition. 
 
Here, the nature of the outcome and the causal process is extremely remote from the 
assassin’s intentions, and yet a systematic treatment of resultant moral luck would require 
that the assassin be held morally responsible for the outcome. Nor does adding an 
epistemic constraint help, since cases can be easily generated in which a malintentioned 
agent brings about a foreseeable consequence of her actions in a way different than she 
intends. While die-hard consequentialists might see the appeal of blanket moral 
responsibility for intended outcomes, most others would be skittish about such an 
indiscriminate commitment to moral responsibility for outcomes. Though there is much 
more to be said on the topic, I tentatively conclude that a systematic treatment of resultant 
moral luck cases looks unpromising. 
 
2. The Thirsty Traveler 
  
 Though it creates a problem for a systematic treatment of resultant moral luck, the 
idea that deviance in the causal process reduces moral responsibility is fruitful for 
understanding another well-known puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty 
Traveler. There are many versions of the case, but the basic one goes like this: 
  
Thirsty Traveler. Billy and Suzy are independently dispatched assassins targeting 
Thirsty Traveler. Victim has a canteen full of water that she needs to drink for her 
survival. In an attempt to kill Thirsty Traveler, Billy fills the canteen with poison that 
kills by dehydration. Suzy, unaware of Billy’s assassination attempt, steals the canteen in 
an attempt to deprive Victim of water. Victim goes to drink water from her canteen, but 
cannot find it, and so she dies of dehydration. 
 
The case gives rise to both causal and moral puzzles. Causally, the contributions of both 
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Billy and Suzy seem to cancel each other out. But it would be odd to hold that neither 
assassin causally contributed to Victim’s death: they both, in some sense, brought it 
about. It also seems wrong to hold one or the other assassin fully responsible. The first 
assassin who fills the canteen with poison would have been responsible for the death had 
the second assassin not come along. But due to the second assassin's removal of the 
canteen, first assassin isn't directly causally connected to Victim's death. It also seems 
wrong to hold the second assassin responsible for Victim's death, since stealing a canteen 
that is already full of poison doesn't seem to directly contribute to Victim's death. 
 The case and its variants have spawned myriad causal diagnoses. There is an 
argument to be made that Thirsty Traveler is a strange case of causal overdetermination. 
In a case of causal overdetermination, there are multiple causes sufficient to bring about 
an outcome in roughly the same way, as when Billy and Suzy each throw a rock at a 
window, and both rocks hit the window at the same time. Either rock would have been 
sufficient to shatter the window. In Thirsty Traveler, each assassin is causally sufficient 
for Victim’s deprivation of life-sustaining water. But there is also an argument to be 
made that Thirsty Traveler is a strange case of causal preemption, in which one cause 
preempts the other from bring about the outcome. For example, suppose that Billy and 
Suzy each throw their rocks at a window, but Billy's rock reaches the window and 
shatters it before Suzy's rock can. Billy rock is the preempting cause; Suzy's rock is 
preempted from bringing about the outcome. In Thirsty Traveler, Suzy's stealing the 
canteen preempts Billy's poison from killing Victim.  
 There are more outré causal diagnoses on offer. Some have argued that both 
assassins are collectively responsible.10 Others have argued that neither assassin is 
causally responsible.11 Sartorio (2015) argues that it is the obtaining of a disjunctive fact 
(the stealing-or-substituting) that is the cause: the assassins collectively (but not 
distributively) bring about Victim's death. She also suggests that settling the causal 
puzzle doesn’t necessarily settle the moral puzzle.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For example, Kvart (2002).	  
11	  For example, Moore (2009). 
12	  Sartorio (2015) suggests that such cases exhibit a new form of moral luck involving how many moral 
agents causally contribute to an outcome. In the case with a “natural”, non-human intervener, Suzy is not 
responsible for Victim’s death. In the traditional telling with an additional assassin, Suzy is partly 
responsible. 
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 I won’t argue here for a comprehensive positive answer to the complex causal 
puzzle. Rather, I wish to use the results from the preceding discussion to draw attention 
to a few underexplored features of the case. The first underexplored aspect of Thirsty 
Traveler is its inclusion of deviant causation. Victim’s death occurs due to Billy and 
Suzy’s causal contributions, but it does not occur via the causal process planned by Billy 
or Suzy. The fact that the causal structure is deviant explains a number of puzzling 
intuitions about the case.  
 First, the involvement of deviant causation explains why we seem uneasy calling 
both Billy and Suzy fully morally responsible for Victim's death, even if the case is read 
as causal overdetermination. Even though Victim dies due to dehydration, it is neither 
dehydration-via-poison (as planned by Suzy) nor dehydration-via-deprivation-of-canteen-
water (as planned by Billy). As in deviant cases involving individual agents, the 
mismatch between the causal process and each agent's respective intention reduces moral 
responsibility for the outcome.13 
 Another common intuition about Thirsty Traveler is that there is some sort of 
causal asymmetry between the two assassins, but it is hard to put a finger on exactly what 
it is. One hint draws on my earlier discussion of hasteners and delayers. According to one 
interpretation of the causal structure of the case, Suzy's stealing the canteen causes the 
death to happen later than it would have otherwise: if she had not stolen the canteen, 
Billy's poison would have killed Victim sooner. This means two things. First, Suzy's 
stealing the canteen is a delayer: it delays a death that otherwise would have occurred 
sooner. Second, Suzy's stealing the canteen is a preemptor: it preempts Billy's poison 
from killing Victim. This strange combination of causal features-- being a preemptor but 
also a delayer-- goes some of the way in explaining why we have difficulty diagnosing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Consider an example with a similar structure to Thirsty Traveler, adapted from an actual legal case  
presented by Hart and Honoré (1985):  
 
Angry Neighbors. Neighbors A and B are mad at neighbor C, who lives between them. Neighbor A sets a 
fire, hoping it will destroy C's apartment. Neighbor B unleashes a flood from his pipes, hoping it will 
destroy C's apartment. Neighbor B's flood puts out neighbor A's fire; however, Neighbor C's apartment is 
ruined. 
 
Here, neither Neighbor A nor Neighbor B is fully responsible for the destruction of Neighbor C's apartment 
due to the deviance in the causal chain. Like Thirsty Traveler, there is a cancellation effect of sorts between 
the causes. 
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the causal asymmetry of the case. Being a preemptor is often a signal that something is a 
cause of a particular outcome, as when Billy's rock shatters the window before Suzy's 
rock can reach it. Cases of causal preemption are also cases of resultant moral luck: it is a 
matter out of each agent's control which cause ends up bringing about the effect, and 
which one is merely preempted. We tend to hold the preempting agent causally and 
morally responsible for the outcome. The preempted agent is lucky; the preempting agent 
is unlucky. In Thirsty Traveler, that means that we would hold Suzy causally responsible 
for the Thirsty Traveler's death, since her stealing the canteen preempts Billy's poison 
from killing the victim.  
 But the case is particularly strange because Suzy's stealing the canteen is also a 
delayer in addition to being a preemptor. Being a delayer is not, generally, taken to be a 
way of automatically counting as a cause. That Suzy's stealing the canteen delays the 
death muddies our causal intuitions a bit, because we tend to think that she merely 
changed a death that was already going to occur by making it later. But she also cuts off 
another causal process from occurring-- the death-by-poisoning. The causal asymmetry in 
the case can be chalked up to this strange combination of factors. The moral diagnosis of 
the case can be chalked up to deviant causation, since each agent initiates a causal 
process that eventuates in the intended outcome, but not in the way intended.   
  
3. Conclusion 
 There is a heretofore underexplored tension in our treatment of cases of moral 
luck: luck reduces moral responsibility when a causal chain is deviant, but does not 
reduce moral responsibility when it is merely unlucky that the outcome occurs. Deviance 
of the causal process supersedes occurrence of the unlucky outcome in assessing agents' 
moral responsibility. This intuitive quirk generates an incoherence in the way we treat 
cases of resultant moral luck, but does some valuable explanatory work with respect to 
other puzzles of causation and moral responsibility, including the Thirsty Traveler. There 
is still much investigation to be done into the relationship between causation and moral 
responsibility: the more we think about it, the more puzzling it is.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  	  Thanks to Andrew Khoury, Daniel Nolan, Carolina Sartorio, and Caroline Touborg for 
feedback on this paper. 
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References 
 
Bernstein, S. (2017) "Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility", Oxford Studies in 
Agency and Responsibility, ed. David Shoemaker, Oxford University Press, pp. 165-182. 
 
Bernstein, S. (MS) "Deviant Causation and the Law". 
 
Hart, H. L. A. and T. Honore (1985) Causation in the Law, second ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Khoury, A. “The Objects of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies, Forthcoming: 
1-25. 
 
Kvart, I. (2002) “Probabilistic Cause and the Thirsty Traveler.” Journal of Philosophical 
Logic 31: 139-179. 
 
Lewis, D. (1986) “Causation.” In Philosophical Papers, vol. II (New York: Oxford U.P), 
pp. 159-213. 
 
Mackie, P. (1992) “Causing, Delaying, and Hastening: Do Rains Cause Fires?’, Mind 
101, pp. 483-500. 
 
Moore, M. (2009) Causation and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Sartorio, C. (2015) "Resultant Luck and the Thirsty Traveler" Methode 4(6), 153-171. 
 
Sartorio, Carolina (2012) "Resultant Luck" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
84 (1):63-86. 
 
Touborg, C. (2018). "Hasteners and delayers: why rains don’t cause fires" Philosophical 
Studies 175 (7):1557-1576. 
 
Williams, B. (1993) "Shame and Necessity". University of California Press. 
	  
